### Off

#### The aff should advocate increasing energy production

#### The subject: central government- the USFG.

#### The verb: increase- to make greater. or

#### Reduce excludes removal

Words & Phrases: Perm Edition, 2002, vol 36A, p.80

Mass. 1905. Rev.Laws, c. 203, § 9, provides that, if two or more cases are tried together in the superior court, the presiding judge may "reduce" the witness fees and other costs, but "not less than the ordinary witness fees, and other costs recoverable in one of the cases" which are so tried together shall be allowed. Held that, in reducing the costs, the amount in all the cases together is to be considered and reduced, providing that there must be left in the aggregate an amount not less than the largest sum recoverable in any of the cases. The word "reduce," in its ordinary signification, does not mean to cancel, destroy, or bring to naught, but to diminish, lower, or bring to an inferior state.— Green v. Sklar, 74 N.E. 595, 188 Mass. 363.

#### The objects -Financial incentives means loans/grants

**UNCTAD, 4** - UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT (“INCENTIVES”

http://unctad.org/en/docs/iteiit20035\_en.pdf

There is no uniform definition of what constitutes an “investment incentive”. (Box I.1. contains a list of commonly used incentives.) The only major international instrument that contains a partial definition is the SCM Agreement (see below). Governments use three main categories of investment incentives to attract FDI and to benefit more from it:

· financial incentives, such as outright grants and loans at concessionary rates;

· fiscal incentives such as tax holidays and reduced tax rates;

· other incentives, including subsidized infrastructure or services, market preferences and regulatory concessions, including exemptions from labour or environmental standards.

#### Restrictions are regulatory prohibitions

Words & Phrases 2004 v37A p410

N.D.Okla. 1939. "Restriction," as used in the statutes concerning restriction on alienation of lands inherited from deceased Osage allottees, is synonymous with "prohibition." Act April J8, 1912. §§ 6, 7, 37 Stat. 87, 88.—U.S. v. Mullendore, 30 F.Supp. 13, appeal dismissed 111 F.2d 898.— Indians 15(1).

This is the regulatory part

Words & Phrases: Perm Edition, 2002, vol 36A, p414

N.II. 1938. As used in statute giving towns power to "regulate and restrict" buildings by zoning regulations, "regulation" is synonymous with "restrict" and "restrictions" are embraced in "regulations. Puh.Laws. 1926, c. 41. W A»-y\* r

#### The direct object is energy production

Is Cumulative Fossil Energy Demand a Useful Indicator for the Environmental Performance of Products? M A R K A . J . HUIJBREGTS , \* , † L I N D A J . A . R O M B O U T S , † S T E F A N I E H E L L W E G , ‡ R O L F F R I S C H K N E C H T , § A . J A N H E N D R I K S , † D I K V A N D E M E E N T , † , | A D M . J . R A G A S , † L U C A S R E I J N D E R S , ⊥ A N D J A A P S T R U I J S | Department of Environmental Science, Institute for Wetland and Water Research, Faculty of Science, Radboud University Nijmegen, P.O. Box 9010, NL-6500 GL Nijmegen, The Netherlands, Institute for Chemical- and Bioengineering, Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zu¨rich, CH-8093 Zu¨rich, Switzerland, Ecoinvent Centre, Ueberlandstrasse 129, CH-8600 Duebendorf, Switzerland, Laboratory for Ecological Risk Assessment, National Institute of Public Health and the Environment, P.O. Box 1, NL-3720 BA, Bilthoven, The Netherlands, and Institute for Biodiversity and Ecosystem Dynamics, University of Amsterdam, Nieuwe Achtergracht 166, NL-1018 WV, Amsterdam, The Netherlands 2006 American Chemical Society VOL. 40, NO. 3, 2006 / ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY 9 641 http://pubs.acs.org/doi/pdf/10.1021/es051689g

The appropriateness of the fossil Cumulative Energy Demand (CED) as an indicator for the environmental performance of products and processes is explored with a regression analysis between the environmental life-cycle impacts and fossil CEDs of 1218 products, divided into the product categories “energy production”, “material production”, “transport”, and “waste treatment”. Our results show that, for all product groups but waste treatment, the fossil CED correlates well with most impact categories, such as global warming, resource depletion, acidification, eutrophication, tropospheric ozone formation, ozone depletion, and human toxicity (explained variance between 46% and 100%). We conclude that the use of fossil fuels is an important driver of several environmental impacts and thereby indicative for many environmental problems. It may therefore serve as a screening indicator for environmental performance. However, the usefulness of fossil CED as a stand-alone indicator for environmental impact is limited by the large uncertainty in the product-specific fossil CEDbased impact scores (larger than a factor of 10 for the majority of the impact categories; 95% confidence interval). A major reason for this high uncertainty is nonfossil energy related emissions and land use, such as landfill leachates, radionuclide emissions, and land use in agriculture and forestry.

#### Links

#### 1. The SUBJECT of the action is the AFF team, not the USFG.

#### 2. The OBJECT of the action is the judge, not energy.

#### 1. Infinite regression—disregarding resolutional syntax produces an endless regression to small, trivial plans. For example, an aff only about the subject opens the door to ANY philosophy that speaks to ‘being.’

#### 2. Limits—resolutional limits encourage AFF innovation, predictive research on a designated topic, and clash—a precursor to productive education. Also, the inherent value of arguments within limits is greater, which link turns education arguments.

#### If our interpretation is net-beneficial it means there’s no reason to vote affirmative. If the case is true then it de-justifies the resolution. Teams are still signified by ‘AFF’ and ‘NEG’, so the resolution is a required measurement for ‘affirmation.’

### Off

#### The aff’s focus on the relation between the human and the sun mystifies the material roots of profit in the exploitation of labor rather than nature

DeFazio 12 (Kimberly, English Professor at University of Wisconsin Lacrosse, Winter/Spring 12, Machine-Thinking and the Romance of Posthumanism, http://redcritique.org/WinterSpring2012/machinethinkiSngandtheromanceofposthumanism.htm)

In the 21st century, global capitalism's commodification of all aspects of life has reached new heights, requiring new modes of explaining away the material roots. From cloning and bioengineered food, to ever-newer forms of human-technological hybrids, to overfishing and industrialization of slaughterhouses, to the privatization of public sources of water and the selling of "hot air" (which makes it possible for rich nations to avoid lowering emissions), to the "synthetic biology" by which biocapitalists like J. Craig Venter hope new living creatures will be produced to substitute fossil fuels—there is no aspect of social or natural life that is immune from the market. Capital's endless and inherently crisis-ridden drive to accumulate profit has, on the one hand, led to a new scramble among nations of the global North to privatize the world's dwindling natural resources regardless of the human and ecological consequences. What this competitive drive has lead to, among other things, is the scientific explorations of new bio-horizons: what Venter calls a "new industrial revolution" (Pollack). On the other hand, the most recent effects of capitalist crisis—beginning with the 2007 housing market crash—have been used to justify further privatization of social resources, leading to historically unprecedented cuts in wages, employment and social programs throughout the global North.¶ It is not surprising, then, that cultural theory has become more and more concerned with the relation between human and non-human life and with the instrumentalities used by the former to control the latter. Broadly characterized by a "posthuman" displacement of humanist priorities of reason, rationality and Cartesian dualism, at the center of which is a human subject constructed as fundamentally different from and superior to non-human animals and life and capable of developing reliable knowledge of and control over the objective world—a wide range of cultural writing today has become concerned with the increasing subjugation of nature to human calculation and control, and call for a new inquiry into the relation of the human and its other. Some, like Giorgio Agamben, address the increasing efforts of the state to control and manage all aspects of human and non-human life (Homo Sacer; The Open). Others, like Antonio Negri and Michael Hardt, focus on the efforts by corporations to privatize the knowledges, affects and technologies that have been developed through the collective energies of what they call the multitude: the efforts to enclose the digital commons in the interests of a powerful few (Commonwealth). Graham Harman goes so far as to suggest that the "being" of tools is constitutive of all being in the contemporary moment (Tool-Being), while Peter Menzel and Faith D'Alusio celebrate the displacement of homo sapiens by the notion of robo sapiens (Robo Sapiens). Among one of the most popular developments in contemporary posthumanist theory, animal studies, writers like Cary Wolfe, Donna Haraway, Kelly Oliver, and Matthew Calarco, taking their cue from Derrida's later writings (i.e., The Animal That Therefore I Am), address what is for them the instrumentalizing and unethical discourses of humanism, which justifies its violence toward non-human species by its epistemological centering of the human: the "anthropological machine" (Agamben, The Open).¶ But what drives the "new industrial revolution" (Venter) is what drove the "old" one: the use of technology to appropriate surplus labor (the source of profit) at the point of production. Profit is not derived from "nature" but labor: in order for nature to become a commodifiable resource, it must become transformed by human labor, which is itself a dialectical outcome of nature. This is another way of saying that the commodification of life on such a planetary scale today is only possible on the basis of the commodification of human labor power. Biocapitalism is first and foremost a regime of wage labor.¶ Contemporary cultural theory's concern with the effects of capitalism on non-human life, however, has mystified capital's material roots, and one of the central means by which this has been accomplished is what I call machine-thinking.

#### Capitalism’s preoccupation with endless accumulation will result in total ecological destruction and extinction

Foster 11,[John Bellamy ] Dec. 2011, Capitalism and the Accumulation of Catastrophe, Monthly Review, Vol. 63 Issue 07, <http://monthlyreview.org/2011/12/01/capitalism-and-the-accumulation-of-catastrophe> (Aug 2012)

Yet, the continued pursuit of Keynes’s convenient lie over the last eight decades has led to a world far more polarized and beset with contradictions than he could have foreseen. It is a world prey to the enormous unintended consequences of accumulation without limits: namely, global economic stagnation, financial crisis, and planetary ecological destruction. Keynes, though aware of some of the negative economic aspects of capitalist production, had no real understanding of the ecological perils—of which scientists had already long been warning. Today these perils are impossible to overlook. Faced with impending ecological catastrophe, it is more necessary than ever to abandon Keynes’s convenient lie and espouse the truth: that foul is foul and fair is fair. Capitalism, the society of “après moi le déluge!” is a system that fouls its own nest—both the human-social conditions and the wider natural environment on which it depends. The accumulation of capital is at the same time accumulation of catastrophe, not only for a majority of the world’s people, but living species generally. Hence, nothing is *fairer*—more just, more beautiful, and more necessary—today than the struggle to overthrow the regime of capital and to create a system of substantive equality and sustainable human development; a socialism for the twenty-first century.

#### The alternative is to reject capitalism through revolutionary action towards capitalism

Herod ‘4 James Herod author of several books on capitalism and social activist since 1968 Getting Free 2004 <http://site.www.umb.edu/faculty/salzman_g/Strate/GetFre/06.htm>

It is time to try to describe, at first abstractly and later concretely, a strategy for destroying capitalism. This strategy, at its most basic, calls for pulling time, energy, and resources out of capitalist civilization and putting them into building a new civilization. The image then is one of emptying out capitalist structures, hollowing them out, by draining wealth, power, and meaning out of them until there is nothing left but shells. This is definitely an aggressive strategy. It requires great militancy, and constitutes an attack on the existing order. The strategy clearly recognizes that capitalism is the enemy and must be destroyed, but it is not a frontal attack aimed at overthrowing the system, but an inside attack aimed at gutting it, while simultaneously replacing it with something better, something we want. Thus capitalist structures (corporations, governments, banks, schools, etc.) are not seized so much as simply abandoned. Capitalist relations are not fought so much as they are simply rejected. We stop participating in activities that support (finance, condone) the capitalist world and start participating in activities that build a new world while simultaneously undermining the old. We create a new pattern of social relations alongside capitalist relations and then we continually build and strengthen our new pattern while doing every thing we can to weaken capitalist relations. In this way our new democratic, non-hierarchical, non-commodified relations can eventually overwhelm the capitalist relations and force them out of existence. This is how it has to be done. This is a plausible, realistic strategy. To think that we could create a whole new world of decent social arrangements overnight, in the midst of a crisis, during a so-called revolution, or during the collapse of capitalism, is foolhardy. Our new social world must grow within the old, and in opposition to it, until it is strong enough to dismantle and abolish capitalist relations. Such a revolution will never happen automatically, blindly, determinably, because of the inexorable, materialist laws of history. It will happen, and only happen, because we want it to, and because we know what we�re doing and know how we want to live, and know what obstacles have to be overcome before we can live that way, and know how to distinguish between our social patterns and theirs. But we must not think that the capitalist world can simply be ignored, in a live and let live attitude, while we try to build new lives elsewhere. (There is no elsewhere.) There is at least one thing, wage-slavery, that we can�t simply stop participating in (but even here there are ways we can chip away at it). Capitalism must be explicitly refused and replaced by something else. This constitutes War, but it is not a war in the traditional sense of armies and tanks, but a war fought on a daily basis, on the level of everyday life, by millions of people. It is a war nevertheless because the accumulators of capital will use coercion, brutality, and murder, as they have always done in the past, to try to block any rejection of the system. They have always had to force compliance; they will not hesitate to continue doing so. Nevertheless, there are many concrete ways that individuals, groups, and neighborhoods can gut capitalism, which I will enumerate shortly. We must always keep in mind how we became slaves; then we can see more clearly how we can cease being slaves. We were forced into wage-slavery because the ruling class slowly, systematically, and brutally destroyed our ability to live autonomously. By driving us off the land, changing the property laws, destroying community rights, destroying our tools, imposing taxes, destroying our local markets, and so forth, we were forced onto the labor market in order to survive, our only remaining option being to sell, for a wage, our ability to work. It�s quite clear then how we can overthrow slavery. We must reverse this process. We must begin to reacquire the ability to live without working for a wage or buying the products made by wage-slaves (that is, we must get free from the labor market and the way of living based on it), and embed ourselves instead in cooperative labor and cooperatively produced goods. Another clarification is needed. This strategy does not call for reforming capitalism, for changing capitalism into something else. It calls for replacing capitalism, totally, with a new civilization. This is an important distinction, because capitalism has proved impervious to reforms, as a system. We can sometimes in some places win certain concessions from it (usually only temporary ones) and win some (usually short-lived) improvements in our lives as its victims, but we cannot reform it piecemeal, as a system. Thus our strategy of gutting and eventually destroying capitalism requires at a minimum a totalizing image, an awareness that we are attacking an entire way of life and replacing it with another, and not merely reforming one way of life into something else. Many people may not be accustomed to thinking about entire systems and social orders, but everyone knows what a lifestyle is, or a way of life, and that is the way we should approach it. The thing is this: in order for capitalism to be destroyed millions and millions of people must be dissatisfied with their way of life. They must want something else and see certain existing things as obstacles to getting what they want. It is not useful to think of this as a new ideology. It is not merely a belief-system that is needed, like a religion, or like Marxism, or Anarchism. Rather it is a new prevailing vision, a dominant desire, an overriding need. What must exist is a pressing desire to live a certain way, and not to live another way. If this pressing desire were a desire to live free, to be autonomous, to live in democratically controlled communities, to participate in the self-regulating activities of a mature people, then capitalism could be destroyed. Otherwise we are doomed to perpetual slavery and possibly even to extinction. The content of this vision is actually not new at all, but quite old. The long term goal of communists, anarchists, and socialists has always been to restore community. Even the great peasant revolts of early capitalism sought to get free from external authorities and restore autonomy to villages. Marx defined communism once as a free association of producers, and at another time as a situation in which the free development of each is a condition for the free development of all. Anarchists have always called for worker and peasant self-managed cooperatives. The long term goals have always been clear: to abolish wage-slavery, to eradicate a social order organized solely around the accumulation of capital for its own sake, and to establish in its place a society of free people who democratically and cooperatively self-determine the shape of their social world.

### OFF

The United States federal government removes all restrictions for solar energy production in the United States, except restrictions which treat the sun as an object.

#### PIC – retain the restriction of recognizing our solar knowledge is incomplete – only we affirm the unchecked fury of the speculative position

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For Harman, the tool—any given object—is enmeshed in a set of total relations (i.e. the world). Meanwhile, each object is visible only very partially from any given perspective. "The bridge has a completely different reality for every entity it encounters: it is utterly distinct for the seagull, the idle walker, and those who may be driving across it toward a game or a funeral" (TSR 25). The word utterly here is doing a great deal of work: the claim is that the relation between the seagull and the bridge is of a radically different, wholly unrelated, kind than the relation between the idle walker and the bridge. This allows Harman to claim that "there is an absolute gulf between Heidegger's readiness-to-hand and presence-at-hand" (TSR 26). No matter how it manifests itself, the bridge (or any other object) itself is always infinitely withdrawn. Any relation a walker, a seagull, or a driver in a car may have to it always radically misses what the bridge is, in itself. And any relation, in any modality, we may have with a tool, whether it be practical or contemplative, aesthetic or empirical, also always radically misses the object. Harman's object-orientation entails a concern with the "unchecked fury" of the withdrawn essence of objects (TSR 26). Doing justice to the object itself means affirming such fury, and also affirming that we never reach any object as it is in itself. But crucially, neither does any other object: objects are withdrawn from each other as radically as they are from us. The relation (or non-relation) between bolts and pylons is of exactly the same kind as between humans and the bridge: "all relations are on the same footing" (TSR 202). What's refreshing about Harman is his insistence that bolts and pylons deserve as much or more attention from philosophers as the typical objects of philosophy: language, knowledge, mind, etc.

#### Treating the sun as an accessable object undermines productive speculation – the CP retains the restriction of parataxis – their believe that we can know the sun itself instead of just the object called our “relation to the run” link turns all benefits that flow from speculation

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The obvious question arises of how objects can interact at all if they're also absolutely withdrawn from each other. The second half of Towards Speculative Realism presents Harman's development of this question as well as his solution: vicarious causation. As he has it in an essay on Husserl, "Physical Nature and the Paradox of Qualities," "if hammers, rocks, and flames withdraw from all other entities, then it needs to be explained why anything happens in the world at all" (129); and "since objects cannot touch one another directly they must be able to interact only within some sort of vicarious medium that contains each of them" (TSR 131). Harman's very weird but absolutely ingenious and elegant solution to this problem is that this medium is other objects. Relations themselves are objects. Take again the bridge example: its bolts anchor its pylons into its concrete foundation which is itself dug into the ground. These are all objects in their own right, never encountering one another, always infinitely withdrawn. But taken together, in their relations to one another, the bolts and pylons and foundation and concrete form the bridge itself—which is also wholly withdrawn, even from its constituent parts. It's objects all the way down. Except there is no question of up or down—no level of reality (of scale, complexity, durability, nature, or physical existence) is any more essential or fundamental than any other: "an atom is no more an object than a skyscraper," "an electron is no more an object than a piano," and "mountains are no more objects than hallucinated mountains" (TSR 147-48). While the bridge is certainly composed of parts, the bridge itself is not any one of these parts, nor merely their sum. The bridge names the way in which its parts are related to one another, but it is not itself reducible to this bundle of relations. Throughout, Harman's ontology of an utterly pure, totally positive, completely inaccessible object licenses speculation as the only way we may ever reach anything like an encounter with the object itself. Since "there is no way of approaching equipment [objects] directly, not even asymptotically or by degrees" (47), the only way we have of thinking the withdrawn object or vicarious causation is metaphysics, "speculative theory on the nature of ultimate reality" (TSR 49). Two consequences follow from this.

#### Even if Speculation can be productive, they center it on an object – in this case the sun – this form of speculation is unproductive and embraces the worst forms of correlationism – if the sun worshipers decide to sacrifice people, they have no grounds to oppose it

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These are questions about the nature of speculation in its conjugation by speculative realism. Of course, meditation on the nature of speculation cuts against the grain of the aspiration of speculative realism to break out of the correlationist circle and is much attenuated in TheSpeculative Turn. Attenuated, but not ignored. Ray Brassier and Adrian Johnston hit on the problem, and Alberto Toscano's "Against Speculation" poses it most fully in his treatment of the account of speculation Meillassoux gives in chapter 2 of After Finitude. In Toscano's words, correlationism "designates those structural invariants or transcendental parameters that govern a given world or domain of correlation without themselves being open to rational explanation, deduction or derivation. In this respect, facticity is a form of reflexive ignorance" (ST 85). The "strong correlationism" of Heidegger or Wittgenstein, or really, any anti-foundational philosophy that forbids or foregoes speculation on an ultimate reality behind facticity, is thus a "new obscurantism," "a carte blanche for any and all superstitions" (ST 85). Strong correlationism is complicit with the rise of religiosity because philosophy has removed any vocabulary or grounds for discussing the absolute and irrational. Meillassoux's brilliance lies precisely in the way his thought moves past dumb wonderment at facticity by ontologizing anti-foundationalism as absolute contingency. Here, realism and speculation license each other, and this is the crux of Toscano's critique of Meillassoux. The absolute autonomy of the real, and its absolute exteriority with respect to thought, frees thought from the necessity of being a correlate of being. Yet once you give up any pretension to correlation between thought and being, how can you claim that absolute speculation will have any purchase whatsoever on the absolute of the real? The questions of to what, to whom, in what modes, in what registers, and to what degree thought is (and ought to be) bound are questions that neither The Speculative Turn, nor speculative realist philosophy more generally, has quite known how to pose—even as it also makes them unavoidable.

#### Using speculation to refute conclusions based on reasons is an internal link turn to all the benefits of speculative methologies – this is an internal link turn

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Installing aesthetics as the model for the relation between thought and world would seem to obviate the problem of the correlationist circle (or that's what's in the offing), since as Shaviro would have it, the kind of resonance at issue between thought and world on this model would not name a special form of relation between a subject and an object, but all forms of relatedness between entities. Moreover, this model introduces something like a kernel or splinter of the absolute into every relation of thought and object (or, for that matter, any object with any other). It stages, in miniature, in every encounter between a thought and an object, the kind of move Meillassoux makes at the level of ontology. No appeal to any aspect of the appearance of an object will ever be able, in the last instance, to found any claim about that object whatsoever, as it is in itself. Yet such a claim is not groundless, or irrational: you can always give reasons. (Although eventually, you can only just point or gesture: don't you just see it?) And yet, since there is something fundamentally unaccountable in such a relation, it includes an appeal to something absolute—it is asserted, universally, without being subsumed under a concept.

### 1NC Case

#### Calculation is good and doesn’t devalue life

Revesz 2008 Richard L. Revesz (Dean and Lawrence King Professor of Law at New York University School of Law, JD Yale Law School) and Michael A Livermore. (JD NYU School of Law, Executive Director of the Institute for Policy Integrity, and Managing director of the NYU Law Review). Retaking Rationality How Cots-Benefit Analysis Can Better protect the Environment and Our Health. 2008. P. 1-4.

Governmental decisions are also fundamentally different from personal decisions in that they often affect people in the aggregate. In our individual lives, we come into contact with at least some of the consequences of our decisions. If we fail to consult a map, we pay the price: losing valuable time driving around in circles and listening to the complaints of our passengers. We are constantly confronted with the consequences of the choices that we have made. Not so for governments, however, which exercise authority by making decisions at a distance. Perhaps one of the most challenging aspects of governmental decisions is that they require a special kind of compassion—one that can seem, at first glance, cold and calculating, the antithesis of empathy. The aggregate and complex nature of governmental decisions does not address people as human beings, with concerns and interests, families and emotional relationships, secrets and sorrows. Rather, people are numbers stacked in a column or points on a graph, described not through their individual stories of triumph and despair, but by equations, functions, and dose-response curves. The language of governmental decisionmaking can seem to—and to a certain extent does—ignore what makes individuals unique and morally important. But, although the language of bureaucratic decisionmaking can be dehumanizing, it is also a prerequisite for the kind of compassion that is needed in contemporary society. Elaine Scarry has developed a comparison between individual compassion and statistical compassion.' Individual compassion is familiar—when we see a person suffering, or hear the story of some terrible tragedy, we are moved to take action. Statistical compassion seems foreign—we hear only a string of numbers but must comprehend "the concrete realities embedded there."' Individual compassion derives from our social nature, and may be hardwired directly into the human brain.' Statistical compassion calls on us to use our higher reasoning power to extend our natural compassion to the task of solving more abstract—but no less real—problems. Because compassion is not just about making us feel better—which we could do as easily by forgetting about a problem as by addressing it—we have a responsibility to make the best decisions that we can. This book argues that cost-benefit analysis, properly conducted, can improve environmental and public health policy. Cost-benefit analysis—the translation of human lives and acres of forest into the language of dollars and cents—can seem harsh and impersonal. But such an approach is also necessary to improve the quality of decisions that regulators make. Saving the most lives, and best protecting the quality of our environment and our health—in short, exercising our compassion most effectively—requires us to step back and use our best analytic tools. Sometimes, in order to save a life, we need to treat a person like a number. This is the challenge of statistical compassion. This book is about making good decisions. It focuses on the area of environmental, health and safety regulation. These regulations have been the source of numerous and hard-fought controversies over the past several decades, particularly at the federal level. Reaching the right decisions in the areas of environmental protection, increasing safety, and improving public health is clearly of high importance. Although it is admirable (and fashionable) for people to buy green or avoid products made in sweatshops, efforts taken at the individual level are not enough to address the pressing problems we face—there is a vital role for government in tackling these issues, and sound collective decisions concerning regulation are needed. There is a temptation to rely on gut-level decisionmaking in order to avoid economic analysis, which, to many, is a foreign language on top of seeming cold and unsympathetic. For government to make good decisions, however, it cannot abandon reasoned analysis. Because of the complex nature of governmental decisions, we have no choice but to deploy complex analytic tools in order to make the best choices possible. Failing to use these tools, which amounts to abandoning our duties to one another, is not a legitimate response. Rather, we must exercise statistical compassion by recognizing what numbers of lives saved represent: living and breathing human beings, unique, with rich inner lives and an interlocking web of emotional relationships. The acres of a forest can be tallied up in a chart, but that should not blind us to the beauty of a single stand of trees. We need to use complex tools to make good decisions while simultaneously remembering that we are not engaging in abstract exercises, but that we are having real effects on people and the environment. In our personal lives, it would be unwise not to shop around for the best price when making a major purchase, or to fail to think through our options when making a major life decision. It is equally foolish for government to fail to fully examine alternative policies when making regulatory decisions with life-or-death consequences. This reality has been recognized by four successive presidential administrations. Since 1981, the cost-benefit analysis of major regulations has been required by presidential order. Over the past twenty-five years, however, environmental and other progressive groups have declined to participate in the key governmental proceedings concerning the cost-benefit analysis of federal regulations, instead preferring to criticize the technique from the outside. The resulting asymmetry in political participation has had profound negative consequences, both for the state of federal regulation and for the technique of cost-benefit analysis itself. Ironically, this state of affairs has left progressives open to the charge of rejecting reason, when in fact strong environmental and public health pro-grams are often justified by cost-benefit analysis. It is time for progressive groups, as well as ordinary citizens, to retake the high ground by embracing and reforming cost-benefit analysis. The difference between being unthinking—failing to use the best tools to analyze policy—and unfeeling—making decisions without compassion—is unimportant: Both lead to bad policy. Calamities can result from the failure to use either emotion or reason. Our emotions provide us with the grounding for our principles, our innate interconnectedness, and our sense of obligation to others. We use our powers of reason to build on that emotional foundation, and act effectively to bring about a better world.

#### Human life is inherently valuable

Penner 2005 Melinda Penner (Director of Operations – STR, Stand To Reason) 2005 “End of Life Ethics: A Primer”, Stand to Reason, http://www.str.org/site/News2?page=NewsArticle&id=5223

Intrinsic value is very different. Things with intrinsic value are valued for their own sake. They don’t have to achieve any other goal to be valuable. They are goods in themselves. Beauty, pleasure, and virtue are likely examples. Family and friendship are examples. Something that’s intrinsically valuable might also be instrumentally valuable, but even if it loses its instrumental value, its intrinsic value remains. Intrinsic value is what people mean when they use the phrase "the sanctity of life." Now when someone argues that someone doesn’t have "quality of life" they are arguing that life is only valuable as long as it obtains something else with quality, and when it can’t accomplish this, it’s not worth anything anymore. It's only instrumentally valuable. The problem with this view is that it is entirely subjective and changeable with regards to what might give value to life. Value becomes a completely personal matter, and, as we all know, our personal interests change over time. There is no grounding for objective human value and human rights if it’s not intrinsic value. Our legal system is built on the notion that humans have intrinsic value. The Declaration of Independence: "We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that each person is endowed by his Creator with certain unalienable rights...." If human beings only have instrumental value, then slavery can be justified because there is nothing objectively valuable that requires our respect. There is nothing other than intrinsic value that can ground the unalienable equal rights we recognize because there is nothing about all human beings that is universal and equal. Intrinsic human value is what binds our social contract of rights. So if human life is intrinsically valuable, then it remains valuable even when our capacities are limited. Human life is valuable even with tremendous limitations. Human life remains valuable because its value is not derived from being able to talk, or walk, or feed yourself, or even reason at a certain level. Human beings don’t have value only in virtue of states of being (e.g., happiness) they can experience. The "quality of life" view is a poison pill because once we swallow it, we’re led down a logical slippery slope. The exact same principle can be used to take the life of human beings in all kinds of limited conditions because I wouldn't want to live that way. Would you want to live the life of a baby with Down’s Syndrome? No? Then kill her. Would you want to live the life of an infant with cerebral palsy? No? Then kill him. Would you want to live the life of a baby born with a cleft lip? No? Then kill her. (In fact, they did.) Once we accept this principle, it justifies killing every infant born with a condition that we deem a life we don’t want to live. There’s no reason not to kill every handicapped person who can’t speak for himself — because I wouldn’t want to live that way. This, in fact, is what has happened in Holland with the Groningen Protocol. Dutch doctors euthanize severely ill newborns and their society has accepted it.

The most encompassing observation that can be made regarding global system performance in regard to the conflict dimension concerns the status of major episodes of political violence (armed conflict). These include societal (civil, ethnic, and communal) and interstate (including independence) warfare.3 The global trend in major armed conflict has continued its dramatic decline during the globalization era both in numbers of states affected by major armed conflicts and in total magnitude (figure 3). According to our calculations, the global magnitude of warfare has decreased by over sixty percent since peaking in the mid-1980s, falling by the end of 2009 to its lowest level since 1960. Societal warfare has been the predominant mode of warfare since the mid-1950s; increasing steeply and steadily through the Cold War period. This steep, linear increase in societal warfare is largely explained by a general tendency toward longer, more protracted, wars during that period; internal wars often receiving crucial military and/or material support from foreign states, in many cases linked to the competing superpowers. In contrast, the rate of onset of new societal wars has remained constant since 1946 to the present with an average of about four new societal wars per year. In contrast, the global trend in interstate warfare has remained at a relatively low level since the end of the Second World War and the establishment of the United Nations Organization (UN). The UN was specially designed to “maintain international peace and security” without “interven[ing] in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state.” Although there was a moderate increase in interstate wars during the latter years of the Cold War, from 1977 to 1987, like civil warfare, interstate warfare has also declined substantially since the end of the Cold War. Of the interstate wars that took place during the Cold War period, many of the most serious were wars of independence fought during the decolonization phase that occurred during the first half of the Cold War period. Of the conventional interstate wars, onsets occurred at the rate of about one event per year, although onsets occurred at about double that rate during the late 1970s and early 1980s. Of sixty seven such wars, three-quarters remained at fairly low levels of violence.

#### No root cause of war – decades of research votes aff

Cashman 2000 Greg Cashman (Professor of Political Science at Salisbury State University) 2000 “What Causes war?: An introduction to theories of international conflict” pg. 9

Two warnings need to be issued at this point. First, while we have been using a single variable explanation of war merely for the sake of simplicity, multivariate explanations of war are likely to be much more powerful. Since social and political behaviors are extremely complex, they are almost never explainable through a single factor. Decades of research have led most analysts to reject monocausal explanations of war. For instance, international relations theorist J. David Singer suggests that we ought to move away from the concept of “causality” since it has become associated with the search for a single cause of war; we should instead redirect our activities toward discovering “explanations”—a term that implies multiple causes of war, but also a certain element of randomness or chance in their occurrence.

#### Ontology focus at the expense of action causes paralysis

McClean 2001 David McClean (philosopher, writer and business consultant, conducted graduate work in philosophy at NYU) 2001 “The cultural left and the limits of social hope” http://www.american-philosophy.org/archives/past\_conference\_programs/pc2001/Discussion%20papers/david\_mcclean.htm

There is a lot of philosophical prose on the general subject of social justice. Some of this is quite good, and some of it is quite bad. What distinguishes the good from the bad is not merely the level of erudition. Displays of high erudition are gratuitously reflected in much of the writing by those, for example, still clinging to Marxian ontology and is often just a useful smokescreen which shrouds a near total disconnect from empirical reality. This kind of political writing likes to make a lot of references to other obscure, jargon-laden essays and tedious books written by other true believers - the crowd that takes the fusion of Marxian and Freudian private fantasies seriously. Nor is it the lack of scholarship that makes this prose bad. Much of it is well "supported" by footnotes referencing a lode of other works, some of which are actually quite good. Rather, what makes this prose bad is its utter lack of relevance to extant and critical policy debates, the passage of actual laws, and the amendment of existing regulations that might actually do some good for someone else. The writers of this bad prose are too interested in our arrival at some social place wherein we will finally emerge from our "inauthentic" state into something called "reality." Most of this stuff, of course, comes from those steeped in the Continental tradition (particularly post-Kant). While that tradition has much to offer and has helped shape my own philosophical sensibilities, it is anything but useful when it comes to truly relevant philosophical analysis, and no self-respecting Pragmatist can really take seriously the strong poetry of formations like "authenticity looming on the ever remote horizons of fetishization." What Pragmatists see instead is the hope that we can fix some of the social ills that face us if we treat policy and reform as more important than Spirit and Utopia.

Bataille’s Ecstasy and Sun thesis gets co-opted to fascist ends.

Wolin ’6 (Richard, Distinguished Professor of History at the City University of New York-http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/City\_University\_of\_New\_York Graduate Center, "Left Fascism: Georges Bataille and the German Ideology"Constellations vol. 2 issue 3, pp. 397-428)

**In the worldview of both Bataille and that of German young conservatives, war plays an essential, positive role**. It serves as a means of dissolving the *principium individuationis*: the principle of a bourgeois subjectivity, on which the homogenous order of society - a world of loneliness and fragmentation – depends. **For, according to Bataille, “the** *general* **movement of life is... accomplished beyond the demands of individuals.”**32 **It is in precisely this spirit that he celebrates the non-utilitarian nature of “combat” or “war” as a type of aestheticist end in itself:** “*Glory...*expresses **a movement of senseless frenzy, of measureless expenditure of energy, which the fervor of combat presupposes.** Combat it glorious in that it is always beyond calculation at some moment.”33 For the same reasons, Bataillsssse eulogizes those premodern “warrier societies in which pure, uncalculated violence and ostentatious forms of combat held sway.”34 **For under such conditions, war** was not made subservient to the vulgar ends of enterprise and accumulation, as is the case for modern-day imperialism, but **served as a glorious end in itself. Yet in the early 1930s, it was precisely this aestheticist celebration of “violence for violence’s sake,” or “war for war’s sake,” that Benjamin viewed as the essence of modern fascism**. As he remarks in a well known passage: “*Fiat ars – pereat mundus*,” says fascism, and, as Marinetti admits, expects war to supply the artistic gratification of a sense pereption that has been changed by technology...**Mankind**, which in Homer’s time was an object of contemplation for the Olympian gods, now is one for itself. Its self-alienation **has reached such a degree that it can experience its own destruction as an aesthetic pleasure of the first order**. This is the situation of politics which fascism is rendering aesthetic.35 **In Bataille’s thought war serves as the harbinger of a cultural transfiguration in which the prismacy of self-subsistent subjectivity would be replaced by the values of an** “unavowable” or “**ecstatic community”:** that is, a community that would no longer be governed by the goals of a “visual culture” – transparency, self-identity, etc. – but instead, those of self-laceration, difference, and finitude. **In fact this Bataille-inspired program of an ecstatic community has been quite explicitly carried forth and explored** in the political writings of Maurice Blanchot (*La Communaute inavouable;* 1983) and Jean-Luc Nancy (*La Communaute desoeuvree;* 1985).

No value living Turn

Bataille wildly inflates the value of ecstasy and tempting death – in doing so, he ignores the value of living

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**Life is a serious business** of highly charged temporal stakes, involving a being’s struggle to secure for itself the experience of pleasure time/free time rather than pain time/slave time. **Since lived time is a living stake, death is not the profound phenomenon that Bataille thinks it is. For one who is racked by drawn-out pain, the pain of death** situated at the end of time **is an irrelevance. And for one who is caught up in the throes of extended pleasure, the dubious pleasure of death is likewise irrelevant. Death, far from being profound, may simply provide a pragmatic escape from a life of pain** and toil, **or a simple halt to a life of pleasure** and freedom. **We can see death as important to time** in that it is the end of the great game of time, the great flow. **But death is relative in importance to time for the same reason; it is simply the end of the great game of time**, a game without which it would be pure abstraction. **However, we are not suggesting that death has absolutely no importance for living beings. On the contrary. By countering Bataille’s view of death,** which tries to domesticate death through attempting to engage it in ‘intimate’ dialogue, and **which tries to make political gain out of death, we can see death as a real, non-negotiable phenomenon.** Death can no longer be thought of as an ambiguous but essentially accessible deity, but must instead be seen as that which wipes out real substantial time with no hope of appeal. Death can now be viewed as a certain element in the game of time, as something to be dreaded or desired as the end of time, but which has no fixed moral or political meaning in itself. By affirming the reality of time we are in fact affirming the reality of death, and so we are proposing a more tragic philosophy than the one Bataille proposes – which is ironic, given that Bataille is considered by most postmodernist/ post-structuralist philosophers to be perhaps the cruellest thinker.

Bataille’s starting point is so-obsessed with finding meaning through death that he becomes death-obsessed. Bataille’s not "no value to life", he’s "no value to living"

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**For Bataille**, the **full engagement** with the truth of transience **generates a form of wild abandon** (which unfetters forces that would otherwise be invested in conservative projects), but if we see pro-transience as an end game, as a pointless act of looking through the wrong end of a telescope, this view of time is shown to be about as exuberant as nostalgia TV. Pro-transience is in fact less audacious than a priest’s remorse, a slave’s regret. Conclusion Time must no longer be treated merely as a form of fiction, to be used in a fast and loose manner by storytellers in order to mould moral and political beliefs. Instead, time must be treated as a raw phenomenon, being itself the stake over which moral and political forces fight. **Time must no longer be seen as a pristine phenomenon that could receive its essence from a single instance (in Bataille’s view, this instance is death**). Rather, time must be seen as a vulgar plenitude that encompasses everything that happens. Time must no longer be seen as an existential option that can be authentically transcended in an instant to its end, but rather as something that is experienced by living beings as unavoidable and irreducible in its flow. **To see all life from life’s end is to see all life with the eyes of the dead. To think all time from time’s end is to think with the mind of the dead. It is time to quietly drop this pro-transience philosophy of time, which is hardly a philosophy at all. Instead we must begin to observe what time looks like from the only real vantage point that there is: the vantage point of the living.** **There is no way to experience the world except through time. Time may be transient, but it is all there is.** By dropping the perspective that sees all time from time’s end, one has time. And the pleasures and pains of time are revealed to be excessive stakes.

Bataille overestimates the value of death to the living being – the alt is to max lived time and experiences

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**This work sets out to attack Bataille’s assumption that life is essentially transient**. Using Bergson’s anti-teleological thought experiments, **I** hope to **reveal the ludicrous paradoxes involved in seeing the essence of time in time’s end.** With Bergson, I demand that we consider time to be the whole of its flow. I insist that **Bataille overestimates the importance that death has for living beings, and I affirm instead the intensity of lived time and ongoing experiences**.

Whose ecstasy? Turn –

( ) Two specific links:

First – Bataille links

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**Bataille believes that an affirmation of transience is politically liberating**, **that transience is a vital force that renders absurd the** coerc¶ ive, long-term **projects of the bourgeoisie.** **Yet pro-transience takes away any real consciousness of political stakes when it annihilates a sense of life’s rich duration.** Indeed, a sense of **transience cannot authentically liberate people from co¶ ercive projects**, since such projects are themselves generated by a sense of transience. **People want to gain lingering pleasure and freedom, and to avoid long periods of pain a¶ nd slavery. Bataille’s pro-transience view, on the other hand, evades any sense of these** irreducible **durations;** it therefore evades a sense of the world of time as a world of stakes, as involving elements to be either avoided at all costs or seized! Through this evasion of real time, **Bataille’s thought is politically neutered.** Against Bataille, I insist that **only an affirmation of real time can be politically progressive. For Bataille,** the full **engagement** with the truth of transience **generates a form of wild abandon** (which unfetters forces that would otherwise be invested in conservative projects), **but if we see pro-transience** as an end game, **as a pointless act of looking through the wrong end of a telescope, this view of time is shown to be about as exuberant as nostalgia TV**. Pro-transience is in fact less audacious than a priest’s remorse, a slave’s regret.

**Key to check the worst violence**

**Small ’6** (Jonathan, former Americorps VISTA for the Human Services Coalition, "Moving Forward," The Journal for Civic Commitment, Spring, <http://www.mc.maricopa.edu/other/engagement/Journal/Issue7/Small.jsp>)

What will be the challenges of the new millennium? And how should we equip young people to face these challenges? While we cannot be sure of the exact nature of the challenges, we can say unequivocally that humankind will face them together. If the end of the twentieth century marked the triumph of the capitalists, individualism, and personal responsibility, **the new century will present challenges that require collective action,** unity, and enlightened self-interest. **Confronting global warming, depleted natural resources, global super viruses, global crime syndicates,** and multinational corporations with no conscience and no accountability **will require** cooperation, openness, honesty, compromise, and most of all **solidarity** – ideals not exactly cultivated in the twentieth century. We can no longer suffer to see life through the tiny lens of our own existence. Never in the history of the world has our collective fate been so intricately interwoven**. Our very existence depends upon our ability to adapt to this new paradigm, to envision a more cohesive society.** With humankind’s next great challenge comes also great opportunity. Ironically, modern individualism backed us into a corner. **We have two choices, work together in solidarity or perish together in alienation.** Unlike any other crisis before, **the** noose is truly around the neck of the whole world at once. Global super viruses will ravage rich and poor alike, developed and developing nations, white and black, woman, man, and child. Global warming and damage to the environment will affect climate change and destroy ecosystems across the globe. Air pollution will force gas masks on our faces, our depleted atmosphere will make a predator of the sun, and chemicals will invade and corrupt our water supplies. Every single day we are presented the opportunity to change our current course, to survive modernity in a manner befitting our better nature. **Through zealous cooperation and radical solidarity we can alter the course of human events.** Regarding the practical matter of equipping young people to face the challenges of a global, interconnected world, **we need to teach cooperation,** community, solidarity**,** balance and tolerance in schools. We need to take a holistic approach to education. Standardized test scores alone will not begin to prepare young people for the world they will inherit. The three staples of traditional education (reading, writing, and arithmetic) need to be supplemented by three cornerstones of a modern education, exposure, exposure, and more exposure. How can we teach solidarity? How can we teach community in the age of rugged individualism? How can we counterbalance crass commercialism and materialism? How can we impart the true meaning of power? These are the educational challenges we face in the new century. **It will require a** radical **transformation of our conception of education.** We’ll need to trust a bit more, control a bit less, and put our faith in the potential of youth to make sense of their world. In addition to a declaration of the gauntlet set before educators in the twenty-first century, this paper is a proposal and a case study of sorts toward a new paradigm of social justice and civic engagement education. Unfortunately, the current pedagogical climate of public K-12 education does not lend itself well to an exploratory study and trial of holistic education. Consequently, this proposal and case study targets a higher education model. Specifically, we will look at some possibilities for a large community college in an urban setting with a diverse student body. Our guides through this process are specifically identified by the journal Equity and Excellence in Education. The dynamic interplay between ideas of social justice, **civic engagement**, and service learning in education **will be the lantern in the dark cave of uncertainty**. As such, a simple and straightforward explanation of the three terms is helpful to direct this inquiry. Before we look at a proposal and case study and the possible consequences contained therein, this paper will draw out a clear understanding of how we should characterize these ubiquitous terms and how their relationship to each other affects our study. Social Justice, Civic Engagement, Service Learning and Other Commie Crap Social justice is often ascribed long, complicated, and convoluted definitions. In fact, one could fill a good-sized library with treatises on this subject alone. Here we do not wish to belabor the issue or argue over fine points. For our purposes, it will suffice to have a general characterization of the term, focusing instead on the dynamics of its interaction with civic engagement and service learning. Social justice refers quite simply to a community vision and a community conscience that values inclusion, fairness, tolerance, and equality. The idea of social justice in America has been around since the Revolution and is intimately linked to the idea of a social contract. The Declaration of Independence is the best example of the prominence of social contract theory in the US. It states quite emphatically that the government has a contract with its citizens, from which we get the famous lines about life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. Social contract theory and specifically the Declaration of Independence are concrete expressions of the spirit of social justice. Similar clamor has been made over the appropriate definitions of civic engagement and service learning, respectively. Once again, let’s not get bogged down on subtleties. Civic engagement is a measure or degree of the interest and/or involvement an individual and a community demonstrate around community issues. There is a longstanding dispute over how to properly quantify civic engagement. Some will say that today’s youth are less involved politically and hence demonstrate a lower degree of civic engagement. Others cite high volunteer rates among the youth and claim it demonstrates a high exhibition of civic engagement. And there are about a hundred other theories put forward on the subject of civic engagement and today’s youth. But one thing is for sure; **today’s youth no longer see government and politics as an effective or valuable tool for affecting positive change in the world.** Instead of criticizing this judgment, perhaps we should come to sympathize and even admire it. Author Kurt Vonnegut said, “There is a tragic flaw in our precious Constitution, and I don’t know what can be done to fix it. This is it: only nut cases want to be president.” Maybe the youth’s rejection of American politics isn’t a shortcoming but rather a rational and appropriate response to their experience. Consequently, the term civic engagement takes on new meaning for us today. In order to foster fundamental change on the systemic level, which we have already said is necessary for our survival in the twenty-first century, we need to fundamentally change our systems. Therefore, **part of our challenge becomes convincing the youth that these systems, and by systems we mean government** and commerce, **have the potential for positive change.** Civic engagement consequently takes on a more specific and political meaning in this context. Service learning is a methodology and a tool for teaching social justice, encouraging civic engagement, and deepening practical understanding of a subject. Since it is a relatively new field, at least in the structured sense, service learning is only beginning to define itself. Through service learning students learn by experiencing things firsthand and by exposing themselves to new points of view. Instead of merely reading about government, for instance, a student might experience it by working in a legislative office. Rather than just studying global warming out of a textbook, a student might volunteer time at an environmental group. If service learning develops and evolves into a discipline with the honest goal of making better citizens, teaching social justice, encouraging civic engagement, and most importantly, exposing students to different and alternative experiences, it could be a major feature of a modern education. Service learning is the natural counterbalance to our current overemphasis on standardized testing. Social justice, civic engagement, and service learning are caught in a symbiotic cycle. The more we have of one of them; the more we have of all of them. However, until we get momentum behind them, we are stalled. Service learning may be our best chance to jumpstart our democracy. In the rest of this paper, we will look at the beginning stages of a project that seeks to do just that.

Bataille’s premise of inevitable extinction is simply wrong:

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**I shall assume that time cannot be separated from space**, and that time is essentially a view of what happens to space. If we see time as encompassing all of space, **it is difficult to see time as rushing headlong towards an end, since we must imagine time as having to move through the tangled matter of space to get to any end**: a tortuous procedure. **Time does not cut through space instantly like a magic knife towards an end, so why should we view all time from its end?** Moreover, time is ‘everything that happens’, involving the irreducible durations of pleasure or pain, slavery or sovereignty. Again, with such a rich view of time, **it is hard to see how time can be authentically described as slipping easily towards its extinction. Since time is made up of everything that occurs, the philosophical act of analysing time from the point of view of the annihilation of all occurrence is narrow to the most extreme degree**. How can this backward glance, this posthumous look at time from the illusory vantage point of nothingness, not be an emaciated view, a ‘little’ view? How can such a narrow, such a restricted view of time not be a slave perspective in the Nietzschean sense?

# 2NC

### Perm

#### The aff’s appeals to Van Gogh’s art causes creation of a carnival of difference ensures its cooptation and commidifcation by capitalism

D’Annibale and McLaren ‘4 (Valerie Catamburio, PhD, chairs the Graduate Program in Communication and Social Justice at the University of Windsor, and Peter, professor in the Division of Urban Schooling, Graduate School of Education and Information Studies, UCLA, “The Strategic Centrality of Class in the Politics of "Race" and "Difference”,” Cultural Studies <=> Critical Methodologies, Vol. 3, No. 2, 148-175 (2003), TH)

Because post-al theories of difference often circumvent the material dimensions of difference and tend to segregate questions of difference from analyses of class formation and capitalist social relations, we contend that it is necessary to (re)conceptualize difference by drawing on Marx’s materialist and historical formulations. Difference needs to be understood as the product of social contradictions and in relation to political and economic organization. Because systems of difference almost always involve relations of domination and oppression, we must concern ourselves with the economies of relations of difference that exist in specific contexts. Drawing on the Marxist concept of mediation enables us to unsettle the categorical (and sometimes overly rigid) approaches to both class and difference for it was Marx himself who warned against creating false dichotomies at the heart of our politics—that it was absurd to choose between consciousness and the world, subjectivity and social organization, personal or collective will, and historical or structural determination. In a similar vein, it is equally absurd to see “difference as a historical form of consciousness unconnected to class formation, development of capital and class politics” (Bannerji, 1995, p. 30). Bannerji has pointed to the need to historicize difference in relation to the history and social organization of capital and class (inclusive of imperialist and colonialist legacies) and to acknowledge the changing configurations of difference and “otherness.” Apprehending the meaning and function of difference in this manner necessarily highlights the importance of exploring (a) the institutional and structural aspects of difference; (b) the meanings and connotations that are attached to categories of difference; (c) how differences are produced out of, and lived within, specific historical, social, and political formations; and (d) the production of difference in relation to the complexities, contradictions, and exploitative relations of capitalism. Moreover, it presents a challenge to “identitarian” understandings of difference based almost exclusively on questions of cultural and/or racial hegemony. In such approaches, the answer to oppression often amounts to creating greater cultural space for the formerly excluded to have their voices heard (represented). Much of what is called the “politics of difference” is little more than a demand for an end to monocultural quarantine and for inclusion into the metropolitan salons of bourgeois representation—a posture that reinscribes a neoliberal pluralist stance rooted in the ideology of free market capitalism. In short, the political sphere is modeled on the marketplace, and freedom amounts to the liberty of all vendors to display their different “cultural” goods. A paradigmatic expression of this position is encapsulated in the following passage that champions a form of difference politics whose presumed aim is to make social groups appear. Minority and immigrant ethnic groups have laid claim to the street as a legitimate forum for the promotion and exhibition of traditional dress, food, and culture. . . . [This] is a politics of visibility and invisibility. Because it must deal with a tradition of representation that insists on subsuming varied social practices to a standard norm, its struggle is as much on the page, screen . . . as it is at the barricade and in the parliament, traditional forums of political intervention before the postmodern. (Fuery & Mansfield, 2000, p. 150) This position fosters a “fetishized” understanding of difference in terms of primordial and seemingly autonomous cultural identities and treats such “differences” as inherent, as ontologically secure cultural traits of the individuals of particular cultural communities. Rather than exploring the construction of difference within specific contexts mediated by the conjunctural embeddedness of power differentials, we are instead presented with an overflowing cornucopia of cultural particularities that serve as markers of ethnicity, race, group boundaries, and so forth. In this instance, the discourse of difference operates ideologically—cultural recognition derived from the rhetoric of tolerance averts our gaze from relations of production and presents a strategy for attending to difference as solely an ethnic, racial, or cultural issue. What advocates of such an approach fail to acknowledge is that the forces of diversity and difference are allowed to flourish provided that they remain within the prevailing forms of capitalist social arrangements. The neopluralism of difference politics cannot adequately pose a substantive challenge to the productive system of capitalism that is able to accommodate a vast pluralism of ideas and cultural practices. In fact, the post-al themes of identity, difference, diversity, and the like mesh quite nicely with contemporary corporate interests precisely because they revere lifestyle—the quest for, and the cultivation of, the self—and often encourage the fetishization of identities in the marketplace as they compete for “visibility” (Boggs, 2000; Field, 1997). Moreover, the uncritical, celebratory tone of various forms of difference politics can also lead to some disturbing conclusions. For example, if we take to their logical conclusion the statements that “postmodern political activism fiercely contests the reduction of the other to the same,” that post-al narratives believe that “difference needs to be recognized and respected at all levels” (Fuery &Mansfield, 2000, p. 148), and that the recognition of different subject positions is paramount (Mouffe, 1988, pp. 35-36), their political folly becomes clear. Eagleton (1996) sardonically commented on the implications: Almost all postmodern theorists would seem to imagine that difference, variability and heterogeneity are “absolute” goods, and it is a position I have long held myself. It has always struck me as unduly impoverishing of British social life that we can muster a mere two or three fascist parties. . . . The opinion that plurality is a good in itself is emptily formalistic and alarmingly unhistorical. (pp. 126-127) The liberal pluralism manifest in discourses of difference politics often means a plurality without conflict, contestation, or contradiction. The inherent limitations of this position are also evident if we turn our attention to issues of class. Expanding on Eagleton’s observations and adopting the logic that seems to inform the unqualified celebration of difference, one would be compelled to champion class differences as well. Presumably, the differences between the 475 billionaires whose combined wealth now equals the combined yearly incomes of more than 50% of the world’s population are to be celebrated—a posturing that would undoubtedly lend itself to a triumphant endorsement of capitalism and inequitable and exploitative conditions. San Juan (1995) noted that the cardinal flaw in current instantiations of culturalism lies in its decapitation of discourses of intelligibility from the politics of antagonistic relations. He framed the question quite pointedly: “In a society stratified by uneven property relations, by asymmetrical allocation of resources and of power, can there be equality of cultures and genuine toleration of differences?” (pp. 232- 233).

#### We should focus our criticism on class struggle, ignoring notions of individual power

Zavarzadeh 03, editor of Transformation: Marxist Boundary Work in Theory, Economics, Politics and Culture

(Mas'ud, “The Pedagogy of Totality,” Journal of Advanced Composition Theory 23.1, http://redcritique.org/FallWinter2003/thepedagogyoftotality.htm)

A pedagogy that understand class—as an objectivity—will be able to contribute to its transformation. Without teaching for ending class, which is possible only through understanding it as objective, all acts of pedagogy become acts of cultural adjustment to the dominant social conditions—acts of learning "how power works" (Giroux, Impure Acts, 139) in order to manipulate it and make it work for them. Giroux calls the arts and crafts of manipulating power, "critical pedagogy" and call its manipulators "critical citizens". This is a citizenry, however, that is always concerned with how power works on "them", through "them" and for "them" (not the collective). It is obsessed with "power" and never concerned with "exploitation". It is, in the language of bourgeois stratification, an "upper middle class" citizenry for whom the question of poverty (exploitation) is non-existent, and the only question is the question of personal liberty (power), as Giroux makes even more clear in his stories in Breaking into the Movies: Film and the Culture of Politics; Public Spaces, Private Lives. In the name of a "pedagogy without guarantees" (Impure Acts, 12)—which legitimates the right-wing ideology of "equality of opportunity" but not outcome and the bourgeois obsession with "self-definition and social responsibility" (12) as if these were simply matters of "contingency and contextuality" (12)—Giroux opposes a pedagogy of totality and rejects class as "the totalizing politics of class struggle" (Impure Acts, 25). Indeterminate, non-totalizing cultural interpretations ("producing a language", 12) in pedagogy displace explanatory class critique, and consequently all structural material contradictions are re-written as contingent cultural excess that surpasses all structures. Consequently, racism, in Giroux's contingent pedagogy of adjustment is not the effect of structural economic compulsion (Marx, Capital, 1, 899) but a cultural oppression: the "legacy of white supremacy" (Impure Acts, 66). Giroux and other critical pedagogues always criticize capitalism and regard their pedagogy to be a resistance against it. Their criticism, however, is, in practice a radical complicity with capital because it always erases the fundamental material contradiction of capitalism (the appropriation of products from its producers) and instead focuses on such matters as race, sexuality, gender, and the environment as autonomous sites of the exercise of power. When their teacherly criticism approaches capitalism as an economic system, it is finance capital that is their object of attention. Focusing on finance capital, however, represents money itself ("interest") as the source of wealth. In doing so, it marginalizes labor as the source of value and class as the marker of relations of property and exploitation. Replacing capitalism as wage labor with capitalism as finance capital has been the political goal in the writings of such post-al writers as Derrida (Specters of Marx), Deleuze and Guattari (Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia) and Bataille, The Accursed Share. "In a sense", write Deleuze and Guattari, "[I]t is the bank that controls the whole system and the investment of desire. One of Keynes's contributions was the reintroduction of desire into the problem of money; it is this that must be subject to the requirements of Marxist analysis. That is why it is unfortunate that Marxist economics too often dwell on considerations concerning the mode of production, and on the theory of money as the general equivalent as found in the first section of Capital, without attaching enough importance to banking practice, to financial operations, and to specific circulation of credit money—which would be the meaning of a return to Marixst theory of money". (Anti-Oedipus 230). Focusing on banking effectively diverts attention away from how "money" is obtained at the point of production and instead focuses on the institutions of its distribution, as in Fredric Jameson's "Culture and Finance Capital". In the manner in which Felski and others substitute class affect for class economics, in the left discussion of capitalism, the conceptual analysis of labor as the source of wealth and wage labor as the structure of exploitation are displaced by empathy for those who suffer at the hands of financial institutions such as the IMF and World Bank, as in Amitava Kumar's World Bank Literature—a book of pedagogical mourning and melancholia. The grounding premise of "Culture and Finance Capital", World Bank Literature and other contemporary left writings on capitalism is that it is possible to have capitalism without oppression, namely capitalism as a compassionate exploitation of people by people. Capitalism is for them always and ultimately cultural. It is, as Kumar writes, a web of "power relations" and "cultural practices". In Kumar's affective politics, banks are criticized in order to reform capitalism not to overthrow it. The popularity of "bank writing" in bourgeois left circles now is, in part, grounded in the writings of Pierre Bourdieu who theorizes "capital" as a form of wealth—a resource—which produces power (The Field of Cultural Production, 74-141). Capital is, of course, not a thing but rather a social relation (Marx, Wage-Labour and Capital, 28-30; Capital, 3, 953-0954) that is clearly recognized as such in revolutionary writings on banks (Fidel Castro "Abolish The IMF" (Capitalism in Crisis 288-292). Capitalism is not about "money", it is about the social relations of property: class. Class is not lifestyle, income or job. Nor is it life-chances in the market (Weber), a state of mind or a matter of social prestige or status. Classes are large groups of people differing from each other by the place they occupy in a historically determined system of social production, by their relation (in most cases fixed and formulated in law) to the means of production, by their role in the social organization of labour, and, consequently, by the dimensions of the share of social wealth of which they dispose and the mode of acquiring it. Classes are groups of people one of which can appropriate the labour of another owing to the different places they occupy in a definite system of social economy. (Lenin, "A Great Beginning: Heroism of the Workers in the Rear. 'Communist Subbotniks'" 421). Class is, fundamentally, the relation of the subject of labor to ownership of the means of production; it is the objective social relations of property, not a story of desire, affect or power.

#### Only Marxist criticism can confront inequality – the aff serves to legitimate capitalism by humanizing it not eradicating it

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(Stephen, “What is Orthodox Marxism and Why it Matters Now More than Ever,” February 14, http://www.redcritique.org/spring2001/whatisorthodoxmarxism.htm)

Any effective political theory will have to do at least two things: it will have to offer an integrated understanding of social practices and, based on such an interrelated knowledge, offer a guideline for praxis. My main argument here is that among all contesting social theories now, only Orthodox Marxism has been able to produce an integrated knowledge of the existing social totality and provide lines of praxis that will lead to building a society free from necessity. But first I must clarify what I mean by Orthodox Marxism. Like all other modes and forms of political theory, the very theoretical identity of Orthodox Marxism is itself contested—not just from non-and anti-Marxists who question the very "real" (by which they mean the "practical" as under free-market criteria) existence of any kind of Marxism now but, perhaps more tellingly, from within the Marxist tradition itself. I will, therefore, first say what I regard to be the distinguishing marks of Orthodox Marxism and then outline a short polemical map of contestation over Orthodox Marxism within the Marxist theories now. I will end by arguing for its effectivity in bringing about a new society based not on human rights but on freedom from necessity. I will argue that to know contemporary society—and to be able to act on such knowledge—one has to first of all know what makes the existing social totality. I will argue that the dominant social totality is based on inequality—not just inequality of power but inequality of economic access (which then determines access to health care, education, housing, diet, transportation, . . . ). This systematic inequality cannot be explained by gender, race, sexuality, disability, ethnicity, or nationality. These are all secondary contradictions and are all determined by the fundamental contradiction of capitalism which is inscribed in the relation of capital and labor. All modes of Marxism now explain social inequalities primarily on the basis of these secondary contradictions and in doing so—and this is my main argument—legitimate capitalism. Why? Because such arguments authorize capitalism without gender, race, discrimination and thus accept economic inequality as an integral part of human societies. They accept a sunny capitalism—a capitalism beyond capitalism. Such a society, based on cultural equality but economic inequality, has always been the not-so-hidden agenda of the bourgeois left—whether it has been called "new left," "postmarxism," or "radical democracy." This is, by the way, the main reason for its popularity in the culture industry—from the academy (Jameson, Harvey, Haraway, Butler,. . . ) to daily politics (Michael Harrington, Ralph Nader, Jesse Jackson,. . . ) to. . . . For all, capitalism is here to stay and the best that can be done is to make its cruelties more tolerable, more humane. This humanization (not eradication) of capitalism is the sole goal of ALL contemporary lefts (marxism, feminism, anti-racism, queeries, . . . ). Such an understanding of social inequality is based on the fundamental understanding that the source of wealth is human knowledge and not human labor. That is, wealth is produced by the human mind and is thus free from the actual objective conditions that shape the historical relations of labor and capital. Only Orthodox Marxism recognizes the historicity of labor and its primacy as the source of all human wealth. In this paper I argue that any emancipatory theory has to be founded on recognition of the priority of Marx's labor theory of value and not repeat the technological determinism of corporate theory ("knowledge work") that masquerades as social theory. Finally, it is only Orthodox Marxism that recognizes the inevitability and also the necessity of communism—the necessity, that is, of a society in which "from each according to their ability to each according to their needs" (Marx) is the rule.

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